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On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity
Cass R. Sunstein* and Arden Rowell**
Abstract
There is an elaborate debate over the practice of “discounting” regulatory
benefits, such as environmental improvements and decreased risks to health and life,
when those benefits will not be enjoyed until some future date. Economists tend to think
that, as a general rule, such benefits should be discounted in the same way as money;
many philosophers and lawyers doubt that conclusion on empirical and normative
grounds. Both sides neglect a simple point: Once government has converted regulatory
benefits into monetary equivalents, what is being discounted is merely money, not
regulatory benefits as such. No one seeks to discount health and life—only the money that
might be used to reduce threats to these goods. To be sure, cost-benefit analysis with
discounting can produce serious problems of intergenerational equity; but those
problems, involving the obligations of the present to the future, require an independent
analysis. Failing to discount will often hurt, rather than help, future generations.
Solutions to the problem of intergenerational equity should not be conflated with the
question whether to discount.

Suppose that a proposed regulation will not produce benefits for some period of
years; suppose too that an agency is asked to engage in some form of cost-benefit
analysis before it proceeds with the regulation. Costs will be discounted, on the theory
that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in twenty years. But what should the
agency do about future benefits, such as improved health or averted deaths? Should these
too be "discounted," or should a death in 2025 be treated the same as a death today?
In terms of ultimate outcomes, the choice matters a great deal. If an agency
chooses not to discount, the benefits calculation will shift dramatically from what it
would be if the agency chose a discount rate of, for example, 10%. If a human life is
valued at $8 million, and no discount rate is applied, a life saved 100 years from now is
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worth the same expenditure today as a life saved now: $8 million. But at a discount rate
of 10%, the same life would justify a modern expenditure of only $581.1 For regulation
whose effects would be felt centuries from now, any reasonable discount rate will reduce
substantial benefits, including the populations of large nations, to close to nothing.2 The
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) suggests that agencies should prepare
analyses using rates of both 3% and 7%,3 departing from its suggested 10% rate in the
1980s. But these numbers remain controversial.4 Consider the fact that the midpoint—
5%—would ensure that, if a human life is valued at $8 million, one hundred lives in one
hundred years would be worth a total amount of only $6.25 million today.
In any case, agencies are not bound by OMB guidelines, and in recent years, their
own rates have ranged from as low as 3% (Food and Drug Administration, Department of
Housing and Urban Development) to as high as 10% (Environmental Protection
Agency).5 In fact, the same agency sometimes uses different discount rates for no
apparent reason—with the EPA, for example, using the 10% rate for regulation of
emissions from locomotives, but selecting 7% for regulation of drinking water and 3%
for regulation of lead-based paint.6 In this domain, government practice seems
inexplicably erratic. Key questions are therefore: What discount rate, if any, should
agencies choose?7 Do life and health require some special discount rate—or no discount
rate at all? What is the relationship between discount rates and the rights and interests of
future generations?
We shall attempt to make progress on these questions by offering two claims.
First, regulatory benefits should be discounted at the same rate as money, and for a

1

See Michael Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 706,
742-43 (1998).
2
See Martin L. Weitzman, “Just Keeping Discounting, But . . .”, in DISCOUNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 23 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999).
3
For the 7% rate, see Office of Management and Budget, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs,
57 Fed. Reg. at 53,520 (Nov. 10, 1992); for a more recent suggestion that agencies use both 3% and 7%,
see Circular A-4, 33-34 (September, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol.html (last visited June 6, 2005).
4
See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1373 (2003).
5
See Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory CostBenefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333 (1998).
6
Id. at 1337.
7
Valuable treatments include Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COL. L. REV. 941 (1999); Morrison, Comment, supra note 5.
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reason neglected by all sides in the debate: money is inevitably what is being discounted.8
When regulators appear to “discount” mortality or morbidity, they are actually
discounting people’s willingness to pay to reduce statistical risks; and willingness to pay
to reduce risks should be discounted like all other expenditures. Second, cost-benefit
analysis with discounting can produce serious problems of intergenerational equity, but
these problems are poorly addressed by refusing to discount. It is true that regulatory
decisions based on discounting can produce morally unjustified actions by the present
generation at the expense of posterity. But a refusal to discount does not solve this
problem; in many cases, it could injure, rather than promote, the interests of future
generations. The task of fulfilling the obligations owed by the present to the future should
be addressed directly. It is not appropriately handled by a refusal to discount.
To understand these claims, and their implications for administrative agencies,
reviewing courts, and the general idea of “sustainable development,” we need to back up
a bit.
I. Debates
Everyone agrees that money should be discounted. It is better to have $1000 today
than $1000 in ten years, if only because $1000 today can be invested and made to be
worth much more than $1000 a decade hence. But for life and health, discounting is
greatly disputed in both theory and practice. In an important case, a federal court said that
discounting is necessary to provide an "apples to apples" comparison of costs and
benefits, suggesting that agencies are legally required to use the same discount rate for
health and safety benefits as for dollars.9 Other decisions have insisted on careful
explanations for whatever discount rates agencies choose.10 Economists tend to believe
that the argument for discounting is obvious, though the consensus has started to unravel

8

We do not attempt to specify the appropriate monetary discount rate. For discussion, see
DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 2; RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK
AND RESPONSE 150-55 (2004); Daniel Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future:
Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993); William J.
Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 788 (1968).
9
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
10
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1410-14 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Northern California Power Agency v. FERC, 37 F.3d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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in the last decade.11 Philosophers12 and lawyers13 are often skeptical about discounting.
Philosophers have raised serious doubts about the idea that a future death or illness
should be discounted in the same way as money.14 Lawyers as well have questioned that
idea, suggesting that it depends on contentious empirical or normative assumptions.15
A. Objections and Paradoxes
A central objection is that a life in 2025 is not obviously “worth less” than a life
today. If ten people are killed twenty years hence, the outcome is not worse than if ten
people are killed tomorrow. Thus one critic asks: “What is wrong with discounting
numbers of lives saved? One obvious problem is that death does not recognize human
accounting conventions and death does not discount.”16 In the same vein, Ackerman and
Heinzerling object that “the choice implicit in discounting is between preventing harms to
the current generation and preventing similar harms to future generations. Seen in this
way, discounting looks like a fancy justification for foisting our problems off onto the
people who come after us.”17 They emphasize that with “a discount rate of five percent,
for example, the death of a billion people 500 years from now becomes less serious than
the death of one person today.”18
Defenders of discounting have responded that a refusal to use a discount rate
creates a number of logical and practical conundrums. For instance, a refusal to discount
might require truly extraordinary sacrifices from the present for the sake of the (infinite)

11

See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1021, 1026-27 (2004); John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who
Discount Discounting, 108 Yale L.J. 1901 (1998). Various positions are presented in DISCOUNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 2, with recognition of some of the underlying complexities. See
the Introduction by Paul R. Portney and John P. Weyant, which stresses in particular, “the unease even the
best minds of the profession feel about discounting, due to the technical complexity of the issues and to
their ethical ramifications,” id. at 5.
12
Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS
AND GENERATIONS 144, 148 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND
PERSONS 357 (1984).
13
See SIDNEY SHAPIRO & ROBERT GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH 118-119 (2003); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1553, 1570-73 (2002); FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS (2004).
14
See Cowen & Parfit, supra note 12.
15
See Revesz, supra note 7.
16
See Parker, supra note 4, at1374.
17
See Ackerman & Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless, supra note 13, at 1571.
18
Id.
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future. On one view, the “failure to discount would leave all generations at a subsistence
level of existence, because benefits would be postponed perpetually for the future.”19 At
the very least, a zero discount rate might bias “cost-benefit analysis in favor of rules that
impose excessive sacrifices on the current generation.”20 On the other hand, it also has
been argued that a failure to discount the monetized equivalent of regulatory benefits
would lead to less regulation, not more. Suppose that regulators are indifferent as
between lives saved now and lives saved in the future, but discount costs at some positive
rate. If so, it makes sense for them to delay life-saving expenditures indefinitely, simply
because the cost-benefit ratio will (always) be better in the future.21 “[T]he discounting of
costs but not benefits . . . has a paralyzing effect on a decisionmaker. . . . For any
attractive program, there is always a superior delayed program which should be funded
first. The result is that no program with a finite starting date can be selected.”22
In any case, defenders of discounting have argued that instead of discounting lives
and health as such, regulators might simply use the future discounted (monetary) cost of
saving lives and health at the time when these are actually saved—an approach that is
mathematically identical to ordinary discounting and hence produces the same analysis.23
Summarizing a range of arguments, a general overview suggests that failure to permit a
discount rate will ensure that any cost-benefit “analysis fails to account for the
opportunity cost of resources that are diverted from private investment toward investment
in the proposed rule,” and could therefore “lead the agency to adopt rules that reduce the
welfare of future generations, because the resources could have been invested in assets
with higher rates of return.”24 But these arguments have yet to convince the numerous
19

See DAVID PEARCE & R. KELLY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 223-24 (1990).
20
Id.
21
Emmett B. Keeler & Shan Cretin, Discounting of Life-Saving and Other Nonmonetary Effects, 29
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 300 (1983). Ackerman and Heinzerling discuss this claim and reject it, PRICELESS,
supra note 13, at 193-94, in part on the ground that allowing numerous current deaths would be politically
unacceptable; but the claim is one of the logical implications of refusing to discount, and the fact that it
entails a politically unacceptable outcome does not mean that it is wrong.
22
Keeler & Cretin, supra note 21, at 303. The argument is criticized in Revesz, supra note 7, at 989992.
23
John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 221 (2003).
24
Morrison, Comment, supra note 5, at 1349. This argument has been used by OMB itself, see infra
TAN 45, and it is the closest to the argument we make here; but if our argument is correct, it is unnecessary
to speak of opportunity costs, because what is being discounted is the monetary value of the risk itself. For
questions of intergenerational equity, the argument from opportunity costs is insufficient, because we do

5

critics of discounting. As we shall see, it is by no means clear that the relevant resources
will be “invested” for the benefit of future generations.
Responding to the controversy, some prominent analysts have distinguished
between “descriptive” and “prescriptive” approaches.25 Under descriptive approaches, the
discount rate is chosen by examining the rate of return to capital that has been invested in
a range of possible assets. This is the standard approach of those who advocate
discounting.26 Under prescriptive approaches, the discount rate is selected on the basis of
ethical judgments about the duties of one generation to those that succeed it. These
approaches can lead to dramatically different rates.27 The difficulty is that to be worthy of
adoption, any “descriptive” approach must ultimately be defended in “prescriptive”
terms. It remains disputed whether the best prescriptive arguments require abandonment
of what emerges from the preferred descriptive approach.
B. Building on Preferences
An alternative possibility is to attempt to bracket the moral debates by
investigating people’s actual preferences in this domain.28 Emphasizing the importance of
those preferences, some defenders of discounting have attempted to show that people do
discount future lives. On a standard view, “a zero discount rate is inconsistent with the
observable behavior of individuals, which is arguably the best guide for policy in a
democratic state.”29 But the word “arguably” suggests the normative problem in this
context: Why should the interests of future generations be determined by consulting the
preferences of the present generation? Those preferences might well be self-interested.
not know that those savings will be invested for posterity’s benefit rather than consumed. See Cowen &
Parfit, supra note 12, at 152. Note that many people believe that because of technological advances, future
risks are unlikely to come to fruition, simply because new technologies will permit us to prevent them. As
later discussed in the text, however, this is not a point about discounting itself.
25
See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ch. 4 (J.P. Bruce et al.
eds., 1996); William Cline, Discounting for the Very Long Term, in DISCOUNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 131, 135, 137-39 (Paul R. Portney et al. eds., 1999).
26
See Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for Evaluating
National Energy Options, in ROBERT C. LIND ET AL., DISCOUNTING FOR TIME AND RISK IN ENERGY POLICY
(1982).
27
See Portney & Weyant, Introduction, in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note
2, at 4.
28
See Raymond J. Kopp & Paul R. Portney, Mock Referenda and Intergenerational Decisionmaking,
in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 2, at 87.
29
Id.
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Even if there is a degree of altruism, there is no reason to think that the (bounded)
altruism of the present should settle the moral entitlements of the future.30
In any case, individual preferences in this context are not easy to identify, and
they appear to be subject to framing effects. In an influential paper, Maureen Cropper and
her coauthors conclude that people are indifferent between saving one life today and
saving 45 lives in 100 years—a conclusion that has concrete implications for the
appropriate discount rate.31 This conclusion was based on a study that asked people
whether they would prefer a program that saves “100 people now” or one that saves a
substantially larger number “100 years from now.” But other ways of framing the same
problem yield radically different results.32 For example, most people consider “equally
bad” a single death from pollution next year and a single death from pollution in 100
years—a finding that implies no preference for members of the current generation. In
these ways, measurements of people’s judgments about obligations to future generations
are influenced by framing effects.33 For this reason, it is far from clear that judgments
about discounting can be rooted in actual preferences. Even if those preferences have
moral weight, they are too labile to be a reliable basis for public policy.
C. Health v. Money, Latent Harms v. Future Generations
Within the legal literature, the most influential and elaborate treatment of
discounting future benefits has been offered by Dean Richard Revesz.34 Revesz makes
two central arguments. First, he contends that the primary reasons for discounting
monetary benefits do not apply to risks to life and health.35 Money is discounted for two
reasons: first, it can be invested, and second, most people have a “pure” time preference

30

This objection raises serious questions about the approach in id. For a related criticism of democratic
arguments for discounting, see Cowen & Parfit, supra note 12, at 144-45 (“When those affected have no
vote, the appeal to democracy provides no answer.”).
31
Maureen L. Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs: How the Public Discounts Time
and Age, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 244, 254 (1993).
32
Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future Lives Valued Less?, 26
J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 1 (2003).
33
For a similar result, see Jonathan Baron, Can We Use Human Judgments To Determine the Discount
Rate?, 20 RISK ANALYSIS 861 (2000).
34
See Revesz, supra note 7.
35
Id. at 974-77.
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for current over future consumption.36 But human lives cannot be invested, and a life lost
twenty years hence cannot be “recovered” by investing some sum, or some person, in the
present. Nevertheless, Revesz acknowledges that people may well have a “pure” time
preference that would treat a future risk as less troublesome than a present risk.37 Moore
and Viscusi, for example, have investigated the empirical question, and find a real
discount rate of about 2%, one that “accords roughly with financial market interest rates
for the period, once these nominal rates are adjusted for inflation.”38 Revesz argues that
the existence of time preference justifies some discount rate for future harms that will
affect people now living.39
To see the practical implication, consider the case of arsenic regulation. In its
rationale for the regulation, the EPA treated an arsenic death in the future as equivalent to
an arsenic death in the present, even though an arsenic death is likely to come, if it does
come, decades after current exposures.40 In refusing to discount the latent harms from
arsenic exposure, Revesz’s argument suggests that the EPA’s judgment was wrong, even
arbitrary; some kind of discount rate is clearly appropriate. But Revesz does not argue
that the EPA should adopt a discount rate that is equivalent to the appropriate discount
rate for money. He contends, not implausibly, that there is no reason in the abstract to
think that the time preference for health risks is the same as the time preference for
dollars; and because there is no investment opportunity, any discount rate for health risks
is likely to be much smaller than the market rate of return typically used to discount
money. Hence the use of a market rate of return, on Revesz’s view, is likely to produce a
significant undervaluation of regulatory benefits that will be enjoyed in the future.41 This
is an important conclusion, because it suggests that current government practice should
be substantially changed. The result would be to justify a number of regulations that
cannot now satisfy a cost-benefit test.

36

For a suggestion that a pure time preference is irrational, see Cowen and Parfit, supra note 12, at

155.
37

Revesz, supra note 7, at 975-76.
Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental Health Risks: New Evidence and
Policy Implications, 18 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S-59, S-61 (1990).
39
Revesz, supra note 7, at 983-87.
40
66 Fed. Reg. at 7013.
41
Revesz, supra note 7, at 983.
38
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Second, Revesz contends that it is important to distinguish between latent harms
and risks to future generations.42 An environmentally-induced illness that will come to
fruition today is worse than an environmentally-induced illness that will come to fruition
in twenty years; it is for this reason that some kind of discount rate makes a great deal of
sense for latent harms. But for risks to future generations, Revesz believes that the
argument for discounting is much more fragile.43 Why should a death of a ten-year-old in
2040 count less than a death of a ten-year-old today? Revesz concludes that there is no
good answer to this question, and hence that the standard idea of discounting is not
properly applied to harms faced by members of future generations.44
In its guidance to federal agencies, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
is alert to Revesz’s concerns but disagrees, calling for the same discount rate for money
as for other goods, with a brief reference to opportunity costs: “It is true that lives saved
today cannot be invested in a bank to save more lives in the future. But the resources that
would have been used to save those lives can be invested to earn a higher payoff in future
lives saved.”45 In any case people prefer immediate health gains to equivalent health
gains in the future.46 And because a failure to discount would produce “perverse” results,
OMB suggests that agencies should follow the “professional consensus that future health
effects, including both benefits and costs, should be discounted at the same rate.”47
II. Discounting Money: The Last Generation
We believe that both the defenders and the critics of discounting neglect an
exceedingly simple point, one that supports the conclusion that an “apples to apples”
comparison is indeed necessary. The point is this: Once a risk has been translated into a

42

Id. at 987.
Id. at 988-1003.
44
Id. at 1005-1009. Revesz does argue for a limited role for discounting in the intergenerational
context, suggesting, for example, that present generations should not “spend more when we can achieve the
same result for less,” id. at 1008, and that present generations might well prefer to face environmental
harms in return for “the fruits of greater investments in technological innovation.” Id. These suggestions are
very much in the spirit of our discussion in Part IV below.
45
See Circular A-4, supra note 3, at 35.
46
Id.
47
Id. OMB overstates the professional consensus. See DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY, supra note 2.
43
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monetary equivalent, it should be discounted as such; there is no need for a separate
analysis of the problem of discounting life and health.
To separate this argument from intergenerational issues, to which we turn in Part
IV, let us suppose that the practice of discounting is proposed, but only for those people
who are now living. Imagine that the question involves the practices of what is, in some
part of the world, the Last Generation—a generation of living people who will have no
successors.48
For the Last Generation, the argument for discounting requires only one step:
acceptance of the claim, now standard in the federal government and endorsed by many
critics of discounting, that statistical risks should be turned into monetary equivalents.
Once that claim is accepted,49 the case for a discount rate, one that cuts across all relevant
costs and benefits, follows as a matter of course. It is entirely unnecessary to speak of
opportunity costs, as OMB does, or to ask, as Revesz does, whether the arguments that
apply to money also apply to health and life. The reason is that what is being discounted
is always money, and never health or life as such. When agencies apply a discount rate to
monetized regulatory benefits, they are discounting the relevant monetary amounts, not
life or health.
To understand this point, it is necessary to see how regulators translate reductions
of risk into monetary equivalents. The answer comes from two kinds of evidence. The
first and most important involves real-world markets, producing evidence of
compensation levels for actual risks.50 In the workplace and for consumer goods,
additional safety has a price; market evidence is investigated to identify that price.51 The
second kind of evidence comes from contingent valuation studies, asking people how

48

Cf. Richard Dubourg & David Pearce, Paradigms for Environmental Choice: Sustainability versus
Optimality, in MODELS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 21, 24 (Sylvie Faucheux et al. eds., 1996) (“For
maximizing a single utility function . . . over infinite time cannot help but suggest that we are dealing with
a single generation which exists forever, or even a single individual”).
49
Perhaps it should not be. But the objection to monetization as such is far more general than the
objection to discounting, and we are focusing on the latter objection here.
50
See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992).
51
A valuable and comprehensive overview can be found in W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The
Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003).
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much they are willing to pay to reduce statistical risks.52 Both of these approaches are
controversial, of course, and we do not mean to resolve the controversy here53; the use of
the relevant figures grows out of the simple idea that people should not be forced to pay
for risk protection they do not want.54
Currently, regulators use this evidence to calculate the amounts that people are
willing to pay to avoid certain categories and levels of risk.55 The most frequently used
calculation involves the “value of a statistical life” (VSL). Once an agency has identified
the relevant studies, the calculation of VSL is a product of simple arithmetic. The EPA,
for instance, relies on studies of actual workplace risk, attempting to determine how
much workers are paid to assume mortality hazards.56 If workers must be paid $600, on
average, to eliminate a risk of 1/10,000, the value of a statistical life would be said to be
$6 million. It should be clear, however, that the very idea of valuing a statistical life is
highly misleading; no one is “valuing life.” The real issue involves the valuation of
statistical risks. It would be much more accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the
median monetary value in the relevant population is $600—or that for risks of 1/100,000,
the median monetary value is $60.
Once regulatory benefits have been monetized in this way, regulators are no
longer discounting actual risks to life or health; they are merely discounting the amounts
of money that people are willing to pay to avoid those risks. In discounting these
monetized regulatory benefits, regulators are doing nothing more controversial than
discounting money. It is appropriate to discount the money that people will be willing to
spend on refrigerators, automobiles, movies, books, education, and medicine; the same is
true of the money that people are willing to spend to avoid risks. All money can be
invested and made to grow; it is for this reason that $100 today is worth more than $100
in 2020. To accept discounting for the Last Generation, there is no need to identify
logical conundrums or implausible outcomes that seem to follow from a failure to
52

See, e.g., James Hammitt & Jin-Tau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of
Mortality Risk, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 73 (2004).
53
See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 13.
54
Of course this claim would not justify current practice if the figures are based on a lack of
information or bounded rationality. For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for
Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385 (2004).
55
For an overview, see id.
56
See VISCUSI, supra note 50, for discussion.

11

discount. It is not necessary to embark on complex and disputed empirical studies about
how people compare a health risk in 2020 to a health risk today. Only two steps are
necessary: An appreciation of the theory that underlies current practice, and an
understanding that what is being discounted, always, is money, and not life, health, or the
environment as such.
Return in this light to the question of latent harms and suppose that for the Last
Generation, it is necessary to assign monetary values to a risk that will come to fruition in
2020. Suppose that ordinarily $8 million is the appropriate VSL. If the issue is the value
of eliminating a risk of 1/100,000 in 2020, and if the answer, in 2020, will be $80, that
amount must be subject to the appropriate discount rate for money—and hence the VSL
of $8 million must be discounted too. The reason has nothing to do with discounting risks
or health; it is that an expenditure of $8 million in 2020 is worth only a fraction of $8
million today. Recall that $8 million in 2020 is worth some fraction of that figure now
not for any exotic or theoretically contentious reason, but because the fraction can be
invested and made to grow.
III. Counterarguments
How might this argument be resisted? It is correct to say that national wealth
tends to increase over time, and hence people will likely be wealthier in 2020 than they
now are. Because they will be wealthier, they will demand more to be subject to
statistical risks. For this reason, use of the current VSL to calculate monetary amounts in
the future likely produces unjustifiably low numbers.57 But these are not points against
discounting. They simply suggest that the numbers that must be discounted are higher
than regulators currently recognize. The proper analysis uses a multiplier for national
income growth and other relevant factors, and applies a discount rate from that point.

57

See Revesz, supra note 7; Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, The Rising Price of Nonmarket
Goods, 93 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 227, 229 tbl.1 (2003) (suggesting a likely current value of $12
million). In the context of arsenic regulation, the EPA also noted in its sensitivity analysis that the
appropriate adjustment would increase the VSL from $6.1 million to $6.7 million. National Primary
Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants
Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142). Note also
that wealthier people might not merely be willing spend more because they are wealthier; certain goods,
such as environmental protection, might be especially appealing to wealthier people, whose preferences and
tastes might change as a result of their relative wealth.
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Similarly, it might be objected that agencies are on fragile ground in using labor
market studies to estimate VSL.58 Perhaps workers, accepting a $60 premium to face a
risk of 1/100,000, are insufficiently informed or are subject to some form of coercion.
Perhaps the proper premium is $70, or $100, or $200. If so, agency practice would have
to change significantly; but discounting itself would be unaffected. What would be
discounted would be the proper monetary amounts rather than the improper ones. So long
as any monetary valuation is used, discounting generally follows. To repeat: When
discounting occurs, it is money that is being discounted, not the goods to which monetary
amounts are being assigned.
A separate objection would stress that in the future, technological, medical, and
other changes will produce a range of improvements with respect to health, safety, and
the environment. Harms that we now project, holding current practices constant, might
well not materialize, simply because posterity will be in a position to prevent them. This
objection is plausible in itself, but it is not a claim about discounting. It is true that
regulators who are projecting future harms should attempt to make an accurate
projection, and accuracy requires an appreciation of technological innovation. But a
“probabilistic discount rate,”59 reflecting a judgment about such innovation, should not be
confused with the issues of discounting on which we are focusing here.
A more ambitious counterargument would suggest that the monetary values of
human beings are not the proper basis for valuing some regulatory benefits. Consider, for
example, the continued existence of an endangered species, or the lives of wild horses
and elephants. It is controversial (as it should be60) to say that endangered species and
animals should be valued by aggregating people’s willingness to pay to protect them.
What might be sought is a more deliberative judgment, based on the exchange of reasons
that can be offered on behalf of one or another outcome.61 And perhaps the underlying
concern could be generalized to a range of benefits and amenities. We should agree that
there are many problems with the claim that all goods, including other living creatures,
should be valued by aggregating private willingness to pay. But any method of valuation
58
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will necessarily include the explicit or implicit assignment of monetary values. So long as
that assignment is made, discounting is generally appropriate, because no one doubts that
it is appropriate to discount money.62
A final objection would ask some questions about the temporal distribution of the
risks to be faced by the citizens of the Last Generation. Suppose that some citizens will
face risks imminently, whereas others will face risks in a decade, and still others will face
risks in twenty or even thirty years. It should be readily apparent that with discounting,
imminent mortality risks will receive higher values than risks that will not materialize for
many years, and that the same level and kind of risk will elicit a different regulatory
expenditure, depending on when the risk will be faced. Is this wrong or unfair? The
simplest answer assumes that each citizen pays, in full, for the relevant risk reduction.
With that assumption, it should be clear that there is no error or unfairness. It is not unfair
to believe that John will pay $50 to reduce an imminent risk of 1/100,000 while also
assuming that Jane—or even John himself—will pay only some fraction of that amount
to reduce a risk of 1/100,000 in thirty years. That belief follows from the fact that the
monetary value of the future risk can and should be discounted.
But if each citizen will not pay, in full, for the relevant risk reduction, then the
analysis cannot be so simple. When regulatory benefits are enjoyed by people who have
not paid for them, regulations will have a distributional effect, and that effect should be
taken into account.63 It is possible that cost-benefit analysis with discounting will create
distributional problems even within the Last Generation.64 But as we shall now see, this is
not a point about discounting as such, and it does not affect the analysis of discounting
for the Last Generation.
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IV. Intergenerational Equity
A. The Basic Problem
The argument thus far has not explored the question of intergenerational equity.
Of course the amounts spent by future generations involve money, and at first glance that
money must be discounted, simply because it is money. But critics are correct to say that
discounting might contribute to serious problems of intergenerational equity.65 The
reason is that with discounting, a cost-benefit analysis can lead the current generation to
impose extremely high costs on future generations, and such costs might be imposed
without offering compensating benefits to the losers—leading to a net welfare loss, a
serious distributional problem, or both.66 To be sure, people might well have a pure time
preference for money, choosing one hundred dollars today over the financially equivalent
sum in a year67; but a pure time preference on the part of those now living cannot justify a
discount rate with respect to harms faced by people not yet born.68
It is possible, of course, that the current generation will effectively “pay off” the
future generation, making it more than worthwhile for it to bear those costs; the problem
of intergenerational equity would be appear to be resolved if future generations are in fact
compensated for some risk because (for example) adequate sums of money have been
invested for their eventual benefit.69 And the course of human history, with astounding
improvements in wealth, health, and longevity, makes it plausible to suggest that
something like this does happen over time.70 But there is no assurance that it will
continue to occur, in general or for particular risks.71 It follows that in principle and all by
itself, a cost-benefit analysis, based on discounting, can create genuine risks of both net
welfare losses and distributional inequity.72
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It is not at all clear, however, that a refusal to discount is the best way of reducing
those risks. On the contrary, any such refusal might well harm members of future
generations. Our primary submission is that the question of discounting should be
separated from the question of obligations to future generations; it is not productive to
collapse those two questions. If cost-benefit analysis with discounting imposes a serious
loss on members of future generations, the current generation should be asked to fulfill
whatever moral obligations it has. A refusal to discount is a crude and possibly even
perverse way of doing that.
B. Methuselah, Paretoville, and Beyond
To see the relevant considerations, consider five problems. Of these, the fourth
and fifth are most important, but they are best understood in light of those that precede
them.
1. Methuselah. Suppose that society consists of only one person, who, it turns out,
will live for a great many years, even centuries. Let us call him Methuselah. Suppose that
Methuselah will face a set of health risks (by hypothesis, none of them fatal) over time.
Suppose that each risk of concern—those that involve a significant malady—is in the
vicinity of 1/100, and that Methuselah is willing to pay $3000 to eliminate each of these
risks. On standard assumptions, it is fully appropriate to discount, by the appropriate
amount, the monetary value of the relevant risks. If a 1/100 risk will be faced in 2020, it
is worth not $3000, but $3000 discounted to present value. Methuselah can invest that
discounted amount and watch it grow.73 Money is being discounted, not health—a
restatement of our conclusion in Part II.
This conclusion might be questioned if Methuselah is seen as a series of selves
extending over time and if an early self does not act as an appropriate agent for the later
one.74 It is possible that Methuselah should be required to take steps to insure against
serious harms in old age, especially if self-control problems loom large. But if we indulge
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the not implausible assumption that Methuselah is a good agent for his later self,
discounting is fully appropriate.
2. Paretoville. Suppose that everyone in a small town, Paretoville, faces a current
risk of 1/100,000, and that every resident of Paretoville is willing to pay $50, but no
more, to eliminate that risk. The mayor of Paretoville takes this figure very seriously, and
decides not to eliminate risks of 1/100,000 if the cost of doing so is greater than $50.
Under plausible assumptions, involving adequate information and sufficient rationality,75
the mayor is properly using cost-benefit analysis in deciding how to proceed, and there is
no objection from the standpoint of equity. The reason is that every member of
Paretoville pays, in full, for risk reduction, and people should not be required to pay more
than they wish unless there is a problem of inadequate information, bounded rationality,
or harms to third parties.76
In some regulatory contexts, all three problems introduce serious complications77;
but we are assuming that they are absent in Paretoville. For the citizens of Paretoville, the
argument for discounting is straightforward.
3. Dirtyville and Cleanville in Kaldorhicksiana. Two towns, Dirtyville and
Cleanville, are adjacent to one another in the large and somewhat messy state of
Kaldorhicksiana. Dirtyville engages in polluting activity that produces $60 in benefits to
each of its 100,000 citizens. That activity creates a risk of 1/100,000, faced by each of the
100,000 citizens of Cleanville. Each citizen of Cleanville is willing to pay $50, but no
more, to eliminate the risk of 1/100,000 caused by Dirtyville’s polluting activity. On costbenefit grounds, the polluting activity should be allowed; its value is $6 million, which is
higher than its $5 million cost.
But this problem is importantly different from problem (2), because there is a
distributional issue: The citizens of Cleanville are uncompensated losers. If we were
committed to economic efficiency, we would want the polluting activity to continue, but
the distributional problem much complicates matters. And the problem may be worse
still. Because monetized figures rather than direct measurements of welfare are involved,
it is possible that the activity actually creates a net welfare loss, with the citizens of
75
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Cleanville losing more, in welfare terms, than the citizens of Dirtyville gain.78 Suppose,
for instance, that the citizens of Cleanville are relatively poor, and hence their willingness
to pay only $50 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000 is consistent with the conclusion that
they are facing a huge welfare loss from their subjection to that risk. The relatively small
amount each citizen is willing to pay—$50—reflects their relative poverty, not a
relatively small welfare loss. On plausible assumptions about the situation, the state of
Kaldorhicksiana, containing these two towns, is not living up to its name, because the
losers are not, in welfare terms, losing less than the winners gain.
The welfare question could be tested, and the problem could be made analytically
equivalent to problem (2), if the citizens of Dirtyville could be forced to compensate
those of Cleanville, through law or some process of bargaining. But let us suppose that
this is not feasible. In that event, we cannot be sure whether the efficient solution is also
the solution that promotes social welfare. An additional question, a familiar one in
regulatory policy, is whether there should be some kind of equitable or distributional
barrier to the use of cost-benefit balancing.79 If the citizens of Dirtyville are wealthy, and
those of Cleanville are poor, the barrier might well be justified, at least if there is no
mechanism by which the citizens of Cleanville can capture some of the benefits of the
activity.
4. Presentville and Futureville. Presentville engages in polluting activity that
produces $60 in benefits to each of its 100,000 citizens. But the polluting activity does
not harm citizens of Presentville or any other current place; instead it harms members of
future generations. More particularly, the activity creates a risk that will materialize in
one hundred years, in the town of Futureville—which, as it happens, is Presentville a
century from now. In that time, the one million citizens of Futureville will face a death
risk of 1/10,000—meaning that 100 people are expected to die. If the lives of the people
of Futureville are valued at $8 million, it is clear that the polluting activity should stop,
because $800 million is far greater than $6 million. But if money is discounted at an
annual rate of 7%, each of their lives is worth only $581, and hence the polluting activity
should continue, because $6 million is far greater than $58,100.
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But on what premises does it make sense to refuse a $6 million (current)
expenditure to save 100 future lives? If all the people of Presentville and Futureville were
treated as a single person extending over time, then the case would be similar to
Methuselah’s, and discounting would be appropriate. In that case, the various people
would amount to just one person who could invest the relevant resources and use them
later. And it is tempting to suppose that if there were an intergenerational negotiation
between the people of Presentville and the people of Futureville, discounting would be
part of a mutually beneficial trade.80 Here is the reason: The people of Presentville could
agree not to squander or to consume the benefits they receive, but instead to invest a
relevant sum and offer that amount to the people of Futureville, making them better off
on balance. Those who emphasize the opportunity costs of investments as a reason for
discounting, including OMB, implicitly appeal to the idea that future generations will in
fact benefit from the investments that current generations make.81 Hence discounting
might be seen as a part of a (hypothetical) mutually beneficial intergenerational
negotiation.
But there are two problems with relying on that idea. The first is conceptual:
What is the set of background entitlements against which this purely hypothetical
negotiation is occurring? At first glance, the people of Presentville are literally dictators;
they can decide to consume all existing resources, to ruin the environment, to impoverish
posterity, even to remain childless and not create later generations at all. In the
(hypothetical) negotiating process, are the people of Presentville permitted to threaten the
(hypothetical) people of Futureville with nonexistence? If so, how much will Futureville
be able to extract? If not, is this because hypothetical people have some entitlement to be
permitted to exist? And if Presentville merely threatens Futureville with impoverishment
and desperation, the people of Futureville will be in a singularly weak position to extract
protection against (say) individual risks of 1/100,000. In short, the idea of a mutually
beneficial deal raises serious conceptual difficulties. At the very least, it is necessary to
identify some entitlements on the part of both Presentville and Futureville, setting the
background against which they might bargain. To be plausible, any such specification
80

See Lind, supra note 71, at 176-77; Dexter Samida, Improving Lives by Discounting Them
(unpublished draft, March 2005).
81
See supra.

19

will inevitably have to depend on an independent normative account of some kind, and
that independent account, rather than a notion of intergenerational bargaining as such,
will be doing the crucial work.82
The second problem is pragmatic. Suppose, as is plausible, that there is no
mechanism to ensure that any mutually beneficial bargain will be enforceable; the
citizens of Presentville might simply consume their resources instead.83 To be sure, the
problem could be solved with compensation, and the discounted value of the 100 future
deaths should be used if Futureville will benefit from the investment of that sum. If so,
the case would be quite similar to case (2) (back to Paretoville). But as we have noted,
there is no assurance that this will be the case.84
It should be clear that as a result of cost-benefit analysis with discounting, the
problem of Presentville and Futureville has many features in common with that of
Cleanville and Dirtyville. But the problem of Presentville and Futureville nonetheless
raises distinct questions: What does the present owe the future? Is the present obliged to
compensate the future for the injuries it causes? What can the idea of “compensation”
mean in this context? We will shortly return to these questions.
5. Reality. Turn now to a more realistic example, involving global warming.85
Suppose, as is plausible, that the primary victims of global warming will include poor
people in India and Africa.86 Suppose that social planners concerned about global
warming decide what to do by engaging in cost-benefit analysis and discounting the
victims’ costs to present value. If so, such victims will not be much helped, because no
one is planning to invest the discounted sum to create a fund to compensate them in the
future. It is true that on an optimistic view, technological innovations might mean that
what we see as likely deaths end up as mere illnesses (and perhaps minor illnesses at
82

Hence Rawls rejects the idea of intergenerational bargaining in favor of a just savings principle; see

below.
83

See Portney & Weyant, supra note 27, at 6; Lind, supra note 71, at 176-77; Cowen & Parfit, supra
note 12, at 151-52. Donohue, supra note 11, defends discounting on the ground that it “is appropriate in
that, if invested, our resources are expected to grow at [the stated] rate, so that if we forego spending and
invest the money instead, we can save more lives in the future with the amount foregone today.” Id. at
1905. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that case (4) is the same as case (1) — that society
is a kind of giant Methuselah, which it clearly is not.
84
See Lind, supra note 71, at 176-77.
85
See POSNER, supra note 8, at 151-52.
86
WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL
WARMING (2000).

20

that). But this possibility does not justify discounting; it is instead an effort to deny that
the anticipated harms will be as large as we project. If that number is inflated, then of
course the analysis must change.
It is also true that future generations are likely to be wealthier than our own, and
hence it might not make much sense for the relatively poor present to transfer resources
to the relatively rich future.87 This would be a perverse form of redistribution. If future
generations can be expected to be richer, that point must be part of the analysis of what
equity requires. And if future generations can be expected to be richer, their anticipated
wealth is produced by some combination of the efforts, investments, and altruism of their
predecessors—a point that compounds the concern about perverse redistribution. But
suppose, for example, that a relatively poor community is gaining $5 million as a result
of activity that will cause 100 deaths in a relatively wealthier community. Is the activity
justified merely because poorer people are obtaining the benefit, which by hypothesis is
much smaller than the cost? That claim would be exceedingly difficult to defend. It is in
this light that cost-benefit analysis with discounting can indeed produce serious problems
across generations, including a net welfare loss and distributional unfairness.
Responding to concerns of this sort, Thomas Schelling argues that “[g]reenhouse
gas abatement is a foreign aid program, not a saving-investment problem of the familiar
kind.”88 For long-term problems, including global warming, it might be thought that the
question is whether the current generation should provide “foreign aid” to posterity. And
because posterity is likely to be wealthier than we are,89 there is a serious question
whether such aid will or even should be provided. As Schelling suggests, citizens of the
developed world are not now willing to make significant sacrifices to help people in poor
nations; it would seem extremely unlikely that such citizens would be willing to make
significant sacrifices to assist people in those same nations in the distant and probably
less-poor future.90
But Schelling’s analogy runs into serious difficulties. In our example, Futureville
is not merely a foreign country; it consists to a large extent of Presentville’s own
87

See Schelling, supra note 70.
Thomas Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, in DISCOUNTING
EQUITY, supra note 2, at 99, 100.
89
Id. at 100-101.
90
Id. at 101.
88

21

AND

INTERGENERATIONAL

descendents, and the risks faced in Futureville are a direct result of Presentville’s
actions—both plausible reasons to think that Futureville might have special obligations
towards Presentville. The idea of “foreign aid” seems an exceedingly poor fit for
problems like that of global warming, in which environmental and health risks in some
Futureville are a product of actions undertaken knowingly (and perhaps negligently) by
some Presentville. In that event, the present might well be seen to have committed a kind
of tort on the future, and the argument for compensation is hardly a claim for some kind
of subsidy, or “aid.”
To give a stark example, imagine that present generations plant a bomb that will
explode in two centuries. Is this a violation of the obligation to provide “foreign aid”?
Environmental problems are rarely bombs, for they are not created with malice or any
kind of self-consciously destructive goal; but if they result from activities that are
projected to create risks, they must be analyzed in the general terms of tort law. This
point has important implications for global warming. The risks, faced above all by poor
nations, are a result of actions from which wealthier nations have benefited.
C. Not Discounting as a Crude Response to the Intergenerational Problem
1. Discounting and moral obligations to posterity. Suppose that those of us in the
present generation believes that we have moral obligations to our successors, either
because those successors will be our children’s children, or because whoever they are,
they will be injured by our actions. The key point—what we seek to emphasize here—is
that refusing to discount is not a good way of fulfilling these obligations.91 Indeed, any
such refusal might well hurt posterity. The moral obligation is best discharged not by a
zero discount rate, but by asking the current generation to ask more directly about what it
is morally obliged to do.
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A refusal to discount, often justified as a way of assisting the future,92 is a
singularly crude way of attempting to fulfill any obligation to future generations. The
consequence of refusing to discount might well be to reduce investments, economic and
otherwise, that will lead to long-term prosperity. If so, then discounting is hardly helpful
to future generations, which greatly benefit from economic growth, not least because
growth can lead increase the amounts spent on environmental protection. Alternatively, a
refusal to discount might well result in the postponement of protective programs,
environmental and otherwise.93 In that event as well, the future is to that extent hurt
rather than helped.94 Our simple point is this: The moral obligations of current
generations should be uncoupled from the question of discounting, because refusing to
discount is not an effective way of ensuring that those obligations are fulfilled. The moral
issues should be investigated directly, and they should be disentangled from the practice
of discounting.
2. Theory. We have argued that future generations might well have a legitimate
complaint if current generations follow the path indicated by cost-benefit analysis with
discounting. But what kind of complaint do they have? To answer that question, it is
necessary to say something about the nature of intergenerational equity.
It is tempting to think of ethical obligations in compensatory terms, as in the idea
that ethical obligations are satisfied if the present can make it worthwhile for future
generations to run the risks to which it subjects them. But this idea turns out to be a false
start, because it is hard to know what the idea of compensation means in this context.
Must the present compensate the future for each particular risk? That conclusion would
be implausible; surely it would be acceptable to impose a risk of 1/100,000 on ten million
future people if the very step that imposes that risk also eliminates a 1/10,000 risk that
would be faced by one hundred million future people (including the ten million future
people subjected to the new 1/100,000 risk). At first glance, then, the goal should be to
produce an overall “risk package” for which adequate compensation has been paid. But to
what, exactly, is this overall risk package being compared? To a situation in which future
generations face extreme poverty and catastrophic global warming? To a situation in
92
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which future generations do not exist at all? Do members of future generations have
rights to exist? These questions are closely connected with the difficulty of specifying the
background entitlements against which any hypothetical bargaining occurs.95
In short, it is necessary to specify the baseline against which any “compensation”
must be paid, and the real moral work is being done by that baseline, not by the idea of
compensation. The relevant baseline must consist of a more general account of the ethical
obligations owed by the present to the future.96 Some people believe that current
generations are obliged not to make the environment worse than it is today.97 On this
view, current generations are environmental trustees; as such, they must adhere to a kind
of environmental nondegradation principle. But there is a problem with this position,
which is its selective focus on environmental quality. Suppose that the current generation
sacrifices a pristine area, or a remote island, but that as a direct result of that action, it is
able to confer significant economic and even environmental benefits on posterity. Is it so
clear that the sacrifice is morally unacceptable?
John Rawls emphasizes a more promising approach, embodied in a “just savings”
principle, to be chosen by people behind a veil of ignorance in which “they do not know
to which generation they belong or, what comes to the same thing, the stage of
civilization of their society.”98 For Rawls, the key point is the extension of the device of
the veil of ignorance to the intergenerational question. What approach would people
95
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select if they were unaware of the generation in which they will find themselves? Rawls
also contends that his conception of justice as fairness ought to inform choices behind the
veil. What is required, on his view, is a system of savings that will bring “about the full
realization of just institutions and the equal liberties,”99 with close attention to the
“standpoint of the least advantaged of each generation.”100 Under this approach, costbenefit analysis with discounting is morally problematic if it leads to decisions that (for
example) greatly injure the most disadvantaged members of future societies. The proper
response would be to take steps to conform to the just savings principle, chosen behind
the veil of ignorance.
On this view, for example, it would be unacceptable to refuse to take steps to
protect against global warming if the refusal meant that the least advantaged members of
future generations would suffer hardship well beyond that of the least advantaged
members of the current generation. On the other hand the current generation would not be
required to take protective measures that would produce extreme hardship for its own
least advantaged members, at least if that hardship would exceed what is anticipated for
the least advantaged members of future societies. And indeed, some debates over global
warming devote attention to issues of exactly this sort.101
In a later treatment, Rawls contends that it is unhelpful to “imagine a
(hypothetical and nonhistorical) direct agreement between all generations.”102 Instead the
parties, behind the veil of ignorance, might be “required to agree to a savings principle
subject to the further condition that they must want all previous generations to have
followed it.”103 This savings principle, thus understood, has the advantage of treating all
generations the same, thus protecting against the dual problems of impoverishing the
present and impoverishing the future. Here as well, an approach that harmed the most
disadvantaged members of current generations for the sake of the future would be
disfavored, and a key question would be whether that approach was necessary to protect
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the most disadvantaged members of future generations from still greater harm (as, on a
pessimistic view, is the case of emissions of greenhouse gases104).
Rawls’ own approach, emphasizing equal liberties and the least advantaged
members of society, is not utilitarian or welfarist; it builds on his idea of justice as
fairness. But it would be easy to adapt the idea of a veil of ignorance for utilitarian or
welfarist purposes. From the welfarist point of view, the goal should be to maximize
welfare over time. Welfarists would want current generations to give members of future
generations the same moral weight that they give to existing people. Hence the current
generation violates its ethical responsibilities if it engages in projects that lead to net
welfare losses, measured after including the interests of all generations.105 If existing
practice produce significant long-term environmental harm, in a way that lead to serious
health risks for posterity, the current generation is violating its duties.
We believe that the idea of a veil of ignorance is both helpful and appealing, and
that it points in the right directions for thinking about intergenerational equity. But our
aim here is to sketch rather than to solve that problem. Our simple point is that behind the
veil, a refusal to discount would not be chosen, because the refusal would often hurt
future generations as well as the current one. Whatever the proper approach to
intergenerational equity, the debate over that issue should be separated from the debate
over discounting, and the former debate should be engaged directly.
3. Conclusions. Some simple conclusions follow from this analysis. Cost-benefit
analysis with discounting can produce serious distributional problems, and can easily lead
to a net welfare loss. The proper response is to take steps to ensure that present
generations do not violate their obligations to posterity. On an optimistic view, no special
steps are necessary. Some combination of market forces and ordinary altruism tends to
ensure that those who come later are, in all relevant respects, significantly better off than
those who came before.106
But perhaps the optimistic view is unrealistic for some problems, such as global
warming. Suppose that global warming imposes truly catastrophic losses on the world as
104
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a whole, or at least on the most vulnerable members of the most vulnerable nations.107
Even if the losses from global warming are not catastrophic, it would be surprising if the
gains from refusing to spend money on greenhouse gas emissions turned out to protect
those who are most likely to suffer as a result of greenhouse gas emissions. When the
optimistic view fails, the current generation is obliged take self-conscious steps to protect
its successors. Our goal is not to specify the mechanisms by which the current generation
fulfills that obligation, but to suggest that whether or not the optimistic view is right, a
refusal to discount is not the appropriate response to the risk of intergenerational inequity.
D. A Note on Sustainable Development
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the topic of
“sustainable development,” an idea that has considerable force in international law.108
Unfortunately, the idea of sustainability remains poorly defined. An influential report
suggests that development is sustainable if it “meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”109 Implicitly
using a framework not unlike Rawls’, Robert Solow defines sustainability to require each
generation to have the capacity to attain the same levels of welfare as those that preceded
it.110 For the environmental context, Solow contends that this definition means that
nonrenewable resources must be used so as not to make it impossible for future
generations to acquire the same standard of living.111 Edith Brown Weiss argues that each
generation has a duty not to make the environmental quality of the planet worse and also
to preserve the essential options available to future generations.112
Each of these specifications is contentious, for reasons that should be clear from
the discussion thus far. But if the idea of sustainable development is designed to require
present generations to pay attention to the interests of those who will follow, it points in
107
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the right directions and should have considerable practical importance. Of course most
people are willing to sacrifice their own well-being for the benefit of their children; and
as we have noted, the arc of human history suggests that the standard of living increases
over time in any case. But for some goods, including some environmental amenities,
long-term losses are possible unless steps are self-consciously taken to avoid them; and
depletion of the ozone layer, threats to endangered species, and global warming threaten
to impose large-scale risks on posterity.113
To the extent that the idea of sustainable development is meant to require a
specific policy of preserving environmental goods, it offers a valuable reminder that
current actions can produce short-run economic benefits while also creating long-term
environmental problems. The reminder is especially important in the face of potentially
irreversible environmental change.114 But environmental protection can burden the future
too, especially if it is extremely costly, and there is no abstract reason to believe that
preserving a particular environmental amenity (a forest, a lake) is always better for
posterity than other investments that do not involve the environment in particular
(expenditures on basic research, reductions in national debt). The appropriate conclusion
is that an emphasis on sustainable development must be taken as a placeholder for a set of
conclusions, requiring specification and independent justification, about what
intergenerational equity requires.
E. Implications
What are the implications for reviewing courts and for regulatory practice? The
question of judicial review is the easiest to handle. Courts are correct to require some
kind of rationale for any particular discount rate (including a discount rate of zero).115 An
implausibly high discount rate (say, 10%) would have to be explained, as would an
implausibly low one (say, 1%). But the great complexity of the underlying issues, and the
continued existence of reasonable disagreement, argue for a cautious judicial role,
113
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especially because of the risk that judicial invalidations will simply stall desirable
regulation.116 Of course extreme cases can be imagined.117 Suppose that an agency
refuses to discount the monetary value of health and safety benefits at all. If so, it would
be reasonable to rule that the agency’s refusal is arbitrary, and perhaps any resulting
regulation should be struck down if the refusal to discount is responsible for its content.
Under current circumstances, a discount rate of 10% would be extremely difficult to
defend. But across a wide range of agency choices, judicial deference is the best general
orientation.
Our discussion provides considerable support for OMB’s general posture of
requiring the same discount rate for all costs and benefits.118 It does so not on the basis of
OMB’s unruly and complex rationale,119 but on the ground that for latent harms, what is
being discounted is money, and not risks to life and health as such. To the extent that
regulations will mostly affect currently living people, a uniform discount rate is fully
appropriate. Unfortunately, agencies have not always followed OMB’s guidance with
respect to discount rates.120 On this issue, at least, they ought to so do.
The analysis must be more complicated when planners are affecting the welfare of
future generations—as, for example, in the assessments of values associated with
protection against global warming. It is standard to use a uniform discount rate for such
values.121 Nothing said here suggests that the standard practice is wrong. But we have
emphasized that for such problems as global warming, cost-benefit analysis with the
usual discount rate can produce both welfare losses and serious unfairness.122 In this
context, social planners should not base their decisions solely on such analysis with
discounting; any judgments about appropriate regulation must include steps that will
fulfill the present generation’s moral obligations to the future. For global warming, a
separate international fund, provided mostly by wealthy nations and accompanying
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reductions in greenhouse gases, may well be a place to start. Such a fund could be used to
promote further reductions and also to help nations that most suffer from global
warming—by, for example, furnishing technological assistance to facilitate adaptations to
hotter climates. Of course it is possible that the feasible steps to assist adaptation would
not be adequate, and that prevention is therefore preferable.
Conclusion
The debate over discounting regulatory benefits has become both vigorous and
exceedingly complicated. In our view, both advocates and critics of discounting have
missed a central point. So long as monetary values are assigned to the relevant variables,
it is only money, and not any variable as such, that is being discounted. If a discount rate
is properly applied to money, it is properly applied to the money that public or private
actors are willing to devote to regulatory benefits. There is no need for a separate
assessment of the discount rate applied to “latent harms.” What is being discounted is the
money that is used to combat those harms.
In many respects, current valuations may be too low—perhaps because they do
not consider national income growth, perhaps because cancer risks deserve particular
attention,123 perhaps because they do not include the valuations of those whose friends
and family members are at risk.124 But as a general rule, it should not be controversial to
apply the monetary discount rate to monetized regulatory benefits, simply because no one
doubts that money should be discounted.
It is true that cost-benefit analysis with discounting, no less than cost-benefit
analysis of any kind, can produce a net welfare loss, significant distributional difficulties,
or both. For this reason, decisions based on that form of analysis can create severe ethical
problems. But a refusal to discount might well fail to solve those problems. It may even
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aggravate them, either by impoverishing the present (to the detriment of the future) or by
requiring the delay of life-saving programs (also to the detriment of the future). Current
generations do owe moral duties to posterity, and it is important to prevent actions that
impose serious losses on those who will follow. We have suggested that the idea of a veil
of ignorance is the appropriate foundation for thinking about the problem
intergenerational equity. But that problem should be engaged directly; it should not be
conflated with the question of discounting.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Cass Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
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